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THE STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR FOR
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS AFTER
TWO AND A HALF YEARS: HAS IT CHANGED
THE LAW? HAS IT ACHIEVED WHAT
CONGRESS INTENDED?
RICHARD A. ROSEN*
This Article examines the safe harbor for projections and forward-looking
statements created by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("Act" or "Reform Act)."' The Article asserts that the statute essentially
codifies, and does not radically modify or extend, the substantial body of
judge-made law that has evolved over many years. As a result, given the
paucity of judicial interpretations of the Reform Act in the first two and a
half years after its enactment, it is to judicial decisions arising under the
predecessor statute that one must have recourse in understanding how to
apply the safe harbor.
The Article then considers the reasons why the safe harbor, despite
congressional expectations that it would foster more forward-looking
disclosure by issuers, has wholly failed to achieve this result. Finally, the
Article discusses the bills currently pending in Congress that are addressed to
the shortcomings of the safe harbor, including the "Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1988," which has garnered the support of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the White House, and which was
passed by the Senate by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-one on May 13, as
well as the similar but not identical bill passed by the House on July 21. This
Article argues that enactment of some version of the proposed legislation is
necessary to achieve congressional goals, and that the Senate bill is well
suited to this end.
* Richard A. Rosen is a litigation partner of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New
York City, where he is chair of the firm's Securities, Futures and Derivatives Litigation practice group.
A substantial portion of his practice is devoted to defending public companies, underwriters and
financial service firms in class actions.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). An earlier version of portions of this Article was published as Walter Rieman et al., The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Users Guide, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 143 (1996).
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I. THE REFORM ACT SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS
The single greatest impetus to passage of the Reform Act was the
perception-amply supported by the evidence-that issuers had been
deterred from making projections and from disseminating soft information
because of a fear of liability if their public statements failed accurately to
predict the future. The Conference Report's Statement of Managers found
that fear of litigation from inaccurate projections had "muzzled" corporate
management, and that technology companies with volatile earnings were
especially vulnerable. The Statement of Managers focused on significant
evidence of abuse in private securities litigation, including all-too-frequent
races to the courthouse upon any significant change in an issuer's stock price,
and extortionate settlements that hurt shareholders.2
The Act was intended to bolster the protections for projections, forward-
looking statements and other "soft" information by incorporating elements of
the SEC's rule 175 and the highly-developed body of case law construing
and applying the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine. Recognizing that the
previous SEC safe harbor had proven largely ineffective because it could not
be readily invoked to end litigation at the pleading stage of a case, Congress
crafted a new rule that, it was thought, would enable judges to dismiss cases
without inquiring into the state of mind of the defendants or the
reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the forward-looking statement
itself.
Because the Reform Act is an amendment to the 1933 and 1934 Acts, it
does not apply to claims under other federal statutes, or to claims under state
law, whether brought in state court or as a diversity case in federal court. As
we will see, it is this gap in the protections afforded by the Act that has
drastically undermined its effectiveness.
A. What is a Forward-Looking Statement?
The statute defines the types of statements that are "forward-looking"
within the meaning of the Act to include, (a) a statement containing a
projection of revenues, income, earnings per share, capital expenditures,
dividends, capital structure, or other financial items; (b) a statement of
management's plans and objectives for future operations; (c) a statement of
future economic performance, including statements in the MD&A or in the
results of operations; (d) any statement of the assumptions underlying or
2. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,699-705 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Statement of
Managers].
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relating to any statement described above; (e) any report issued by an outside
reviewer retained by an issuer which addresses a forward-looking statement
made by the issuer; or (f) a statement containing a projection or estimate of
such other items as may be specified by rule or regulation by the SEC.3
B. What Kinds of Transactions and Issuers Are Protected by the Act?
The Act reaches a narrower category of transactions and issuers, and is
thus less broadly applicable to securities transactions that are frequently
litigated, than the popular press has suggested. Not all issuers are eligible for
the safe harbor. The company must be required to file annual, quarterly, and
current reports with the SEC before it can qualify.4 The fact that this
qualification applies to the company and not to each class of securities
indicates that the safe harbor is intended to apply to forward-looking
statements made in connection with a privately negotiated transaction
involving unregistered securities, so long as the issuer has also issued
publicly traded securities.
Certain categories of forward-looking statements are not protected by the
Act. These include forward-looking statements contained in a financial
statement prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles; contained in a registration statement or other document issued by
an investment company; and made in connection with a tender offer or an
initial public offering.5 The safe harbor is also inapplicable to an offer by or
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(1) (Supp. II 1996); id. § 78u-5(i)(l). While this definition
encompasses virtually all of the types of soft information that generate litigation, one category has
generated confusion and concern among those who believe that the legislation may shield dishonest
issuers. The protection for statements of "the assumptions underlying or relating to" any forward-
looking statement appears on its face to cover statements that are not themselves forward-looking, but
which state the underlying assumptions on which the issuer is relying in making the projection-
assumptions which, by their nature, may relate to the present state of the company's affairs rather than
to the future. Although this issue-like so many under the statute-will have to await interpretation by
the courts, false statements of historical fact are not covered by the safe harbor at all. It is unlikely that
they will be held to have been immunized by the Act simply by being recited in the context of the
assumptions said to underlie or relate to a forward-looking statement. That is the view expressed in the
Conference Report. See Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(aXl); i. § 78u-5(a)(1).
5. See id. § 78u-5(b)(2)(A)-(D); id. § 77z-2(b)(2)(A)-(D). Beyond this, forward-looking
statements concerning the "business or operations of the issuer" are not within the safe harbor if the
issuer, within the three prior years, was subject to an antifraud SEC consent decree or cease and desist
order or was the subject of a determination that it had violated the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws, or had been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor described in section 15(b)(4)(B) of the
1934 Act. See id. § 77z-2(b)(1)(A); id. § 78u-5(b)(1)(A). Similarly, the safe harbor is not available to
protect projections about the "business or operations of the issuer" made in connection with an
offering of securities by a blank check company; or the issuance of penny stock; or in connection with
a rollup transaction or a going private transaction. See id. § 77z-2(b)(l)(B)-(E); id. § 78u-5(b)(1)(B)-
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relating to the operation of a partnership, limited liability company, or direct
participation investment program or, finally, made in a disclosure of
beneficial ownership of securities made in a Schedule 13(D) filing.6
The two most important exclusions delineated above are undoubtedly
those concerning forward-looking statements in financial statements and in
connection with initial public offerings. The banking industry, which is
frequently the subject of lawsuits concerning loan loss reserves, did not
procure hoped-for protection concerning statements in the financial
statements describing reserves. One of the most interesting developments of
the last two years, however, is that the same kinds of "meaningful cautionary
language" and risk disclosure that one sees in disclosure documents that are
protected by the safe harbor are also showing up in documents disseminated
in connection with unprotected transactions.
The Act protects the statements not only of the issuer but also of a person
acting on behalf of the issuer and "outside reviewers" (a term undefined
anywhere in the Act or its legislative history) who are retained by the issuer
and who are making a statement on its behalf.7 Forward-looking statements
by underwriters are also protected with respect to information either supplied
by the issuer or derived from information provided by the issuer (such as an
underwriters' own analysis of projections supplied by the issuer).8 This
leaves ambiguity regarding whether written reports disseminated after the
quiet period by an analyst employed by the firm that underwrote a securities
issue falls within the safe harbor, such an analyst is not acting on behalf of
the issuer and is arguably not himself an "underwriter." Statements made by
the underwriters and analysts at "road shows" seem to fit comfortably within
the statutory definition. By contrast, the Conference Report states explicitly
that the safe harbor is not intended to be applied to the sales practices of
brokers.9
These exclusions raise interesting litigation issues. As discussed in more
detail below, many of the substantive provisions of the new safe harbor rule
track current law. Thus, one can expect the plaintiffs' bar to argue that
Congress, by excluding certain transactions involving forward-looking
statements from the statutory safe harbor, intended to weaken or remove
parallel judicially-created protections as applied to those excluded
(E). However, because the exclusion from the safe harbor with respect to these categories only applies
to forward-looking statements concerning the "business or operations of the issuer," presumably other
types of forward-looking statements may still fall within the Act's safe harbor.
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b)(2)(E),(F) (Supp. H 1996); id. § 78u-5(b)(2)(E),(F).
7. See id. § 77z-2(a); id. § 78u-5(a).
8. See id § 77z-2(a)(4); id. § 78u-5(a)(4).
9. See Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,704.
[VOL. 76:645
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/6
1998] SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
statements. Against that position, a defendant could cite the statement in the
Conference Report, admittedly made in a different context, that the
committee "does not intend to replace the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine or to
foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts."' More
generally, such a defendant could assert that the statute does not purport to
change existing law in areas the statute does not expressly address.
C. The Role of the SEC
Each of these exclusions is subject to the proviso that the SEC may-by
rule, regulation or order-provide otherwise." The Conference Committee
specifically stated that it intends the safe harbor to serve as a "starting point,"
and that it expects the SEC to promulgate rules expanding the statutory safe
harbor by providing additional exclusions from liability and extending its
coverage to additional types of information.' 2 Given the difficulty the SEC
has had crafting its own revision to the safe harbor of Rule 175, the SEC is
unlikely to move aggressively to expand the Act's safe harbor until it has had
substantial experience operating under the Act. The SEC may be more
willing, however, to specify how the safe harbor should apply in
particularized settings. For example, the SEC has promulgated rules that
require registrants to disclose, among other things, certain market risks
arising from certain holdings of derivative instruments.13 In so doing, the
SEC has invoked its powers under the Act in order to create a safe harbor for
forward-looking statements made pursuant to the new proposed regulations.
Many commentators have suggested that the SEC should also use its rule-
making authority more vigorously, to clarify various ambiguous provisions
of the statute, e.g., by adopting a rule defining the types of cautionary
language that are "meaningful" as that word is used in the Act. Indeed, many
have criticized the SEC for steadfastly refusing to provide guidance to
issuers, either in the context of specific filings reviewed by the staff, or in a
release of more general applicability. The staff has consistently indicated that
it wants to take a "wait and see" attitude before it plunges into this minefield.
Indeed, in November 1997, at the Practicing Law Institute's annual securities
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b) (Supp. H 1996); id. § 78u-5(B).
12. See Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,704.
13. See, e.g., Commodities and Securities Exchanges 17 C.F.R. Parts 210, 228, 229, 239, 240,
and 249 (1998) [Release Nos. 33-7386; 34-38223; IC-22487; Disclosure of Accounting Policies for
Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of
Quantitative and Qualitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial
Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments (Feb. 10, 1997)].
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law conference, this author was on a panel with Brian Lane, the SEC's
Director of Corporation Finance, who explained the staff's reluctance to
provide concrete examples of compliant disclosures this way: "If you say it's
a nice one, you're handing a get-out-of-jail-free card; and if you says it's a
bad one, you'll get a lawsuit.'
4
This position seems short sighted. The SEC staff has a wealth of
experience in dealing with these very issues. Leaving issuers and their
counsel in the dark about the Commission's view of preferable disclosure
practice engenders uncertainty and thus prudent timidity. It is simply
unrealistic to think that many counsel will encourage their public-company
clients to expand the range of their forward-looking disclosures in the present
environment
There are surely a number of factors that have combined to retard
progress in this area, including the agonizingly slow pace at which federal
statutory law is clarified by the courts, the continuing vulnerability of all
issuers to state court litigation under state law and the lack of competitive
pressure to make disclosures when business rivals are also being reticent.
Nevertheless, it is clear to practitioners that the SEC's reluctance to articulate
its views has materially exacerbated the problem.1
5
14. See 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1592 (Nov. 14, 1997).
15. Until recently, little attempt had been made to compile, in any kind of systematic way,
evidence concerning actual use of the statutory safe harbor to provide additional forward-looking
information. However, in November 1997, the author of this Article, along with three colleagues,
published an empirical study of the subject. See Gerald S. Backman et al., Forward-Looking
Statements and Cautionary Language After the 1995 Reform Act: An Empirical Study, in PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, SAILING IN SAFE HARBORS: DRAFTING FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES 153-226
(Ferrara et al. co-chairs, 1997). Our study examined the mechanics of disclosure of forward-looking
statements and attempted to identify any changes in the frequency and substance of forward-looking
statements made by reporting companies both before and after enactment of the safe harbor. To this
end, we studied the filings of more than 60 companies, including firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, the NASDAQ National Market System and the NASDAQ SmallCap Market. The empirical
evidence shows that the safe harbor has had little effect to date on the written disclosure of forward-
looking information. We concluded that, in the absence of federal preemption of state law claims, it
was unlikely that issuers would dramatically alter their disclosure practices. The study is currently
being updated by the Securities Regulation Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, for publication in the fall of 1998. For a contrary view, at least as it applies to the
disclosure practices of high tech companies, see Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation
Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, Research
Paper No. 1471, Stanford University Graduate School of Business (Jan. 1998). The Stanford study
does not identify any company surveyed and quotes no disclosure documents at all, making it
impossible to verify the study's conclusions.
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D. When Are Forward-Looking Statements Immune from Liability?
The heart of the safe harbor provision is the section that defines the
circumstances under which a forward-looking statement is immune from
liability.' 6 Although as of mid-January 1998 there had been only two district
court decisions construing the safe harbor-both very succinct and
unilluminating-this does not leave a would-be interpreter of the scope and
meaning of the Act at a total loss. The intellectual origins of the Reform
Act's safe harbor provisions primarily lie in pre-Reform Act case law. An
account of the pre-Reform Act case law is not an exercise in mere
antiquarianism, but is a necessary step in any explication of the intended
meaning and application of the safe harbor. The Reform Act did little more
than codify and make nationally uniform the better reasoned cases from the
circuit courts; every concept in the safe harbor is fully contemplated by prior
case law. Thus, the result in any given case under the safe harbor as written is
likely to be the same as the result under the pre-Act case law.
Pre-Reform Act jurisprudence is, therefore, the best predictor of how the
statutory safe harbor provisions will be interpreted, and is thus not only a
guide to conduct, but is the best source for elucidating the words of the Act
when litigating. The few cases so far that have addressed the merits of the
safe harbor both illustrate this point. In Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc., the
Middle District of North Carolina used analogies to prior Fourth Circuit law
in holding that forward-looking statements made by the company in
documents filed with the SEC and in press releases bespoke caution.
17
Similarly, in Harris v. IVAX Corp.,'8 the court, relying on the Third Circuit's
pre-Reform Act case of In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation,
19
rejected plaintiffs' contention that the cautionary statements were boilerplate,
pointing out that they were "tailored" to address the very uncertainties
ascribable to the projections at issue. In the In re Valujet case, where
defendant had raised the safe harbor and the bespeaks caution doctrine as
separate defenses, the court nevertheless treated the requirements of the safe
harbor and of prior law as though they dictated identical results.21 Also in
16. The safe harbor provisions apply only to private civil litigations and not to enforcement
proceedings brought by the SEC.
17. Nos. 1:96CV00890, 1:96CV01069, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16968 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1997).
The court also emphasized language from the Conference Report stating that "cautionary statements
[must] identify important factors that could cause results to differ materially-but not all factors." Id.
at *4-5.
18. 998 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
19. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
20. 984 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The Northern District of Georgia refused to dismiss
claims of misleading statements and omissions against Valujet concerning its business plans and safety
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Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., the court drew on pre-Reform Act case law to
support its conclusion that forecasts of future results were actionable only if
the issuer lacked a reasonable basis for them when made.21
It is worth noting that the enactment of the safe harbor will not stem the
flow of pre-Reform Act case law for years to come. This is partly attributable
to the fact that many cases filed before December 22, 1995 have not reached
the summary judgment motion stage, let alone trial. Moreover, if a case was
filed before December 22, 1995, and new defendants or new causes of action
are added in amendments to the original complaint thereafter, the current
trend in the courts is to hold that the Reform Act does not apply to the
amendments.22 By contrast, the argument that the Reform Act should not be
read to apply to conduct that predates its enactment has been rejected.23
In private civil actions based on an untrue statement of material fact or an
omission of a material fact, an issuer is not liable with respect to a forward-
looking statement-whether written or oral-if it meets any one of three
alternative tests:
(a) it is accompanied by meaningful cautionary language;
(b) it is immaterial; or
(c) defendants lacked the requisite state of mind to commit fraud.
This Article will now discuss each of these tests in turn.
record because the statements at issue were not "forward-looking" within the meaning of the safe
harbor. While the defendant characterized at least some of its statements as forward-looking and
covered by the bespeaks caution doctrine, the court countered that "[p]laintiffs do not allege that
Defendants fraudulently announced expansion plans and then failed to follow through on these plans,
Instead, Plaintiffs allege misrepresentation of existing facts," i.e., that "FAA approval was required
before expansion could be consummated."
Curiously, in at least two cases govemed by the Reform Act, the court applied the new pleading
requirements, but ignored the safe harbor when it came to evaluating claims based on forward-looking
statements. See Cherednichenko v. Quarterdeck Corp., 90,108 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), at 90,144
(C.D. Cal. 1997); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997). In one recent case in which
some claims were not covered by the safe harbor (because they were made in connection with an IPO),
but other claims were subject to the Reform Act's rules (because they related to post-offering
disclosures), the court subjected all of the claims to exactly the same analysis and ignored the statutory
safe harbor. See In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 90,137 (CCH) Fed. See. L. Rep. (D. Minn.
Dec. 9, 1997). It seems unlikely that application of the safe harbor to the post-offering disclosures
would have had any impact on the outcome.
21. See Wengerv. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Pfeifer, 940 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re Prudential Sec. Inc.
Lim. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wallace v. Systems & Computer Tech.
Corp., No. Civ. A95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997). But see Krear v. Malek,
961 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Rowe v. Marietta Corp., 955 F. Supp. 836 ("V.D. Tenn. 1997).
23. See Hockey v. Medheker, No. C-96-0815 (MHP), 1997 WL 203704 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15,
1997).
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1. Accompaniment by Meaningful Cautionary Statements
There can be no liability for a forward-looking statement if it is:
identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
24forward-looking statement .
This provision stands in marked contrast to the original House bill (House
Bill 10), which required only a recitation that actual results could differ from
those predicted in the forward-looking statement. In short, Congress
ultimately rejected the proposition that boilerplate warnings would suffice.
Congress rejected an SEC proposal to require the identity of the factors
"most likely to cause actual results to differ," and instead required only the
identification of "important factors., 2 5 As the Conference Report states, "the
cautionary statements must convey substantive information about factors that
realistically could cause results to differ., 26 Although the statute does not
define "meaningful cautionary statements," an abundarfce of case law exists
on this issue. Under both that case law and the Conference Report, an issuer
need not identify all factors that could cause results to differ, and the factor
that ultimately does cause the difference between an optimistic projection
and the final results need not have been one of those identified in order to
come within the safe harbor.
2 7
In most respects, the language of the Act codifies the materiality standard
set forth in the Third Circuit's In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities
Litigation decision 28 and reiterated in numerous other circuits, and makes
that standard uniform nationwide. It should be evident, then, that in
interpreting and applying this branch of the safe harbor, the key feature of
pre-Act case law relevant to understanding and predicting how the safe
harbor will be applied is the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which has been
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
25. Nevertheless, an issuer would be foolhardy to list some, but not all, of the factors that could
cause results to differ. Just as there was under prior law, there will be substantial litigation over
whether a given set of risk disclosures really was meaningful or covered the important factors. The
best protection-and the way to maximize the chances of winning a motion to dismiss-lies in making
a serious effort to identify and disclose all the known material risk factors.
26. Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703.
27. See Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("The Court will not,
looking in hindsight, hold the Defendants to the impossible burden of having to wam of every factor
that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come true. Such an approach was not the
intent of Congress and would effectively eviscerate the safe harbor.").
28. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
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adopted in principle by every circuit to consider it, most recently by the
Tenth Circuit in Grossman v. Novell.
29
The doctrine holds that where a disclosure document's forecasts,
opinions, or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements that are tailored to and directly concern the reasons for the
projection, then the forward-looking statements are immaterial as a matter of
law--even if they are alleged to contain misrepresentations or omissions, or
flunk the SEC safe harbor test30 of reasonableness.
In the Third Circuit's Trump case, decided on a motion to dismiss, the
court assumed the truth of the plaintiff's allegations that the forward-looking
statement was unreasonable or made in bad faith.31 But the court found that
this unreasonableness or bad faith did not matter to the outcome, because if
the investor is furnished with sufficient concrete risk factors that explain why
the forward-looking statement may not be achieved, no reasonable investor
could rely, as a matter of law, on that forward-looking statement. It simply
does not alter the "total mix" of information. "[C]autionary language, if
sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as
a matter of law."
32
From the outset, courts have made it clear that there are limitations on the
availability of the bespeaks caution doctrine. For example, a mere boilerplate
disclosure is insufficient.33 Moreover, as one court has pointed out, "simply
disclosing the factual assumptions which underly" forward-looking
statements is not sufficient.34 The doctrine does not apply to statements of
current or historical facts. The Reform Act adopts the same limitations. As all
the prior case law (including Trump) also makes clear, protection for
forward-looking statements does not extend to the misstatement or omission
of material historical or present facts. And the Conference Report offers
exactly the same proviso, stating that "a cautionary statement that misstates
historical facts is not protected.,
35
29. 120F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997).
31. See generally In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
32. Id. at 371.
33. See Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703, stating that "boilerplate warnings will
not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements.... The cautionary statements must convey
substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ ... such as, for
example, information about the issuer's business." Id.
34. Jakobe v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 943 F. Supp. 1143, 1158 n.13 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
35. Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703. Let us try to make the point clearer with an
example. Suppose that a company disseminates optimistic sales projections for a new pharmaceutical,
but fails to reveal that the Food and Drug Administration has already advised that it believes the
pharmaceutical to be unsafe for use by human beings. That projection would presumably not be
protected under the statute because it omits a material and historical fact-the FDA findings-which,
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Accordingly, in forward-looking statement cases after the Reform Act-
as before its enactment-the main attack one expects to see plaintiffs make is
that the omission or misrepresentation at issue is not about projections or soft
information at all, but involves nondisclosure or misstatement of present or
historical facts. Plaintiffs have become adept at characterizing disclosure of
soft information as outside any safe harbor because they "really" contain an
implicit statement about the company's current situation. This has led the
courts into considerable difficulties, and the results of all the cases are not
readily reconciled.
One of the most clear-headed decisions to tackle this issue is Harris v.
IVAX Corp. cited earlier, issued in March 1998. Judge Moreno hit the nail on
the head:
Plaintiffs' argument is correct from a grammatical perspective only.
While the statement, "We believe that the challenges unique to this
period in our history are now behind us," technically reads as a
statement of present condition the meaning of such a statement is clear
enough: despite the recent rough period, good times are ahead.
Representations regarding the state of a business' position in a
changing market or the soundness of its growth strategies are
necessarily forward-looking. This is especially true where, as here, the
representations are made mid-quarter, before the calculations
businesses use to quantitatively evaluate there financial well being are
completed. The IVAX press releases were not formal, periodic SEC
filings. Until the numbers were crunched at the end of the quarter, the
statements in IVAX's press releases that the hard times were over and
that the state of the company was strong were nothing more than
projections intended to advise the market of anticipated third quarter
financial results. These are exactly the kind of forward-looking
statements that the Reform Act's safe harbor was intended to shield.36
In the Gasner v. Board of Supervisors case from the Fourth Circuit,
decided on New Year's Eve 1996, for example, two judges held that a
statement that a solid waste company's technology was "proven" and had
been incorporated from existing facilities using the same "proven" design
was not actionable because the prospectus negated this statement with
cautionary language that there was no guarantee that the facility would
operate functionally and that the issuer had never operated a similar facility.37
because omitted, makes the projection misleading.
36. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
37. 103 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
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But the dissent said the bespeaks caution doctrine simply does not apply
because the statement regarding the "proven!' characteristics of the design is
not forward-looking at all. "Rather, it involves misrepresentations about,
historical facts. 'Proven' describes an established fact, not a forward-looking
projection. ' M
In a recent decision arising under the statutory safe harbor, the Northern
District of Georgia refused to dismiss claims of misleading statements and
omissions against Valujet concerning its business plans and safety record
because the statements at issue were not "forward-looking" within the
meaning of the safe harbor. While the defendant characterized at least some
of its statements as forward-looking and covered by the bespeaks caution
doctrine, the court countered that "Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants
fraudulently announced expansion plans and then failed to follow through on
these plans. Instead, Plaintiffs allege misrepresentation of existing facts."
Specifically, that "FAA approval was required before expansion could be
consummated." 39 Further, in the case of In re Westinghouse Securities
Litigation, the Third Circuit partially reversed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint because it could not find, as a matter of law, that defendants'
representations were projections and not misrepresentations of historical
fact.4
0
Assuming that the challenged statement is indeed forward-looking, the
bespeaks caution doctrine can be a potent defense. Parnes v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., a case decided by the Eighth Circuit in August 1997, illustrates the
effectiveness of well-drafted cautionary language.4' The plaintiffs claimed
that the computer company misrepresented its obligations to pay sales taxes
to states other than South Dakota. But the court pointed out that the
prospectus warned investors that taxing authorities in other states had sought
information regarding the sufficiency of Gateway's contacts with the states,
that the company had not established any reserves and that it might be
required to pay income or franchise taxes in other states. The court found that
"any reasonable investor would be on notice that Gateway faced potential
state tax liability for states other than South Dakota.' ' 2
Gateway also warned that because of volatility of the computer industry,
the introduction of new products was a risky venture and there was no
assurance of success. This more generalized risk disclosure was also found to
38. Id.at 364.
39. In re Valujet, 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1479 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
40. 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996).
41. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
42. Id at 548.
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be sufficient, even though it says little that is specific to a company or its
products. Yet there is no question that some courts would have found the
latter statement by Gateway to be too general to be "meaningful."
Many opponents of the bill repeatedly argued that under this prong of the
safe harbor, even if an issuer makes a knowingly false prediction of future
success-that is, false because the defendant actually knew at the time that
the projection would be impossible to achieve-the forward-looking
statement is nevertheless immunized from the liability. The Act does indeed
provide that a forward-looking statement can be immune from suit
irrespective of the state of mind of the defendant (which need not even be
investigated by the court) if appropriate cautionary language is present. That
much is perfectly consistent with existing law. In Trump and most other
cases, the courts make clear that if a forward-looking statement is qualified
with concrete, specific risk disclosures that address the factors that may cause
results to differ, the forward-looking statement is immaterial as a matter of
law. It simply does not matter whether the defendants made the projections in
good faith.
I would submit that, however anomalous the result may seem on the facts
of a particular case, this result is correct as a matter of policy as well. The
theory of the Act-like that of much prior case law-is that no reasonable
investor could rely on a forward-looking statement in light of specific
attendant risk disclosures, so a prediction that is adequately hedged with
concrete cautionary language simply is not material.
In any given securities litigation, there is no way for the court or plaintiffs
to know, at the beginning of the case, whether management really committed
a fraud and what its actual state of knowledge was. The Reform Act reflects
the recognition that the social costs, in the aggregate and over the long haul,
of a rule that always allows plaintiffs discovery on the question of the state of
mind of defendants in every case are just too high. These costs are especially
significant in the high technology field where very often there are product
delays and where earnings are frequently volatile and not predictable until
the very end of a quarter.
Of course, it would be wonderful to have a rule that allowed courts and
litigators unfailingly to be able to discriminate among the cases and to allow
discovery to proceed only in those in which there was some reason to believe
that, notwithstanding adequate cautionary language, the company's
management really did know that the predictions were not likely to come
true. But because no such rule could ever be constructed, any rule will either
allow a few dishonest issuers to win motions to dismiss or will impose
enormous costs on honest companies and their shareholders. Congress has
struck the balance in favor of protecting companies and their shareholders-a
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balance which strikes me as absolutely correct.43
2. Immateriality
Even if a forward-looking statement does not meet the test described
above, the Act prohibits the imposition of liability based upon a forward-
looking statement that is "immaterial." 44 On this point the Act merely
confirms existing law: an immaterial statement, even if made with
knowledge that it is false, is not actionable under the 1933 or 1934 Acts. The
Conference Report states that a forward-looking statement can be immaterial
on "other grounds" even if it does not fit within the safe harbor.4a So much is
not in controversy.
What does this mean in the real world? The best way to start to make
some sense of where courts draw the line is to review the only post-Reform
Act case to address the issue, along with some recent pre-Reform Act cases.
In Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., the Northern District of California, relying on
pre-Reform Act case law, held that a forward-looking statement is immaterial
if it is a vague or general statement of optimism.46 Thus, the Court held that
the following statements were not actionable:
* "LUI represents a pure play in the emergence of teleradiology
networks, finally coming of age."
* "We're the leader in a rapidly growing market."
* "We were able to perform two successful acquisitions last
year ...
* "We have the convergence of the health care trends... Lumisys is
positioned at the crest of those two converging trends."
a "We have an extremely broad product line. We cover the
waterfront."
* "Fundamentally, we're just a good company, we know our markets
very well, we dominate these markets, we have good people, a good
management team, and we're positioned to move forward now.'A7
In Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, the Third Circuit found
a statement that the company "believe[d] [it could] continue to grow net
43. One law professor who read this Article before its publication has drawn my attention to an
article of her own that essentially reaches the same conclusion. See Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and
the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: it's Not Just a State ofMind, 58 U. Prr. L. REV. 619 (1997).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 111996); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii).
45. See Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703.
46. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
47. Id.
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earnings at a faster rate than sales" to be immaterial as a matter of law.48 In
Grossman v. Novell, a number of statements regarding growth were found to
be "the sort of soft, puffing statements, incapable of objective verification,
that courts routinely dismiss as vague statements of corporate optimism."
49
As Judge Posner put it, in another case decided last year, a "nonspecific
representation that auction process is going well" for a company is
immaterial because the "heart of a reasonable investor does not begin to
flutter."
50
Courts have also recently found the following statements immaterial: the
company "should deliver income growth consistent with its historically
superior performance" and "we are optimistic about 1993";51 the company
"is on target toward achieving the most profitable year in its history";52 the
company is 'well-positioned' for growth";53 the company "had excellent
new opportunities-domestic and international";5" the company is
experiencing "continued strong demand."
55
What legal principles can be derived from the cases?
First, even if a particular forward-looking statement does not fit squarely
within the technical requests of the cautionary language exclusion of the
Reform Act-for example, because not "identified" as such or not
technically "accompanied" by cautionary language-such a statement should
nevertheless be held to be immaterial as a matter of law because of the risk
disclosures that did appear in the statement.
Second, the "immateriality" provision has also become an avenue for
arguing the continuing vitality of the "truth on the market" defense-in other
words, that all of the information in the marketplace, from whatever source
derived, apprised the marketplace of the risks and thus rendered any
optimistic statement immaterial. Several pre-Reform Act cases adopted this
approach and the post-Reform Act case of Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc. suggests
that it is doing so, as well.56 Thus, in Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the
First Circuit held in 1996 that the review for materiality can be "especially
robust," even at the motion to dismiss stage, where the complaint is alleging
48. 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997).
49. 120 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (10th Cir 1997).
50. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1997).
51. San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801,
811 (2d Cir. 1996).
52. Hillson Partners Ltd. v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204,212 (4th Cir. 1994).
53. In re Caere Corporate Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
54. Wallace v. Systems & Computer Tech. Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997).
55. Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785,791 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
56. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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fraud on the market-and thus the relevant inquiry is whether the market as a
whole is likely to have relied on and been fooled by the statement. 7 The
Second Circuit took the same route in the recent In re Philip Morris
Securities Litigation case.58
Third, the statutory "immateriality" standard can be invoked to protect
statements that the courts have held to be mere puffery or so generalized in
nature that they are immaterial even if unaccompanied by any cautionary
language at all. This statutory test is also derived from pre-Reform Act case
law, particularly strong in the Fourth Circuit, holding that puffery is not
material and thus not actionable. The Fourth Circuit rule was sometimes
construed as stating that predictions of growth or other optimistic opinions
are not actionable at all. But a more nuanced reading of the cases reveals
simply that the courts consistently held that vague, generalized predictions
are immaterial and thus cannot be the basis for a fraud claim. Under pre-
Reform Act law, puffery is immaterial even if unaccompanied by cautionary
language. As the First Circuit put it in Shaw, "not every unfulfilled
expression of corporate optimism" is material, since such "rosy
affirmation[s]" are "numbingly familiar to the marketplace." 59
Finally, the immateriality branch of the safe harbor can also be used to
argue for dismissal of claims about forward-looking statements that are
stale-that is, when they predate plaintiff's purchase by a significant period,
especially where, in the intervening period, information from issuers and
other sources has been assimilated by the market.60
Although many courts have been reluctant to address questions of
materiality on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim, a number of judges prior to enactment of the Act have proven willing
to do so. 6 ' The Act and its procedural provisions should be construed as an
invitation for judges to dispose of more cases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage on
materiality grounds.
3. ActualKnowledge ofFalsity
Even if a forward-looking statement is not accompanied by cautionary
57. 82 F.3d 1194,1218 (Ist Cir. 1996); see also Wallace, 1997 WL 602808.
58. 872 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), afJ'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., San Leandro
Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. 82 F.3d at 1217.
60. See, e.g., Rand v. Cullinet Software Inc., 847 F. Supp. 200 (D. Mass. 1994).
61. A recent article discusses this line of judicial decisions. See Steven B. Rosenfeld,
Immateriality as a Matter of Law: An Effective Curb on Securities Fraud Litigation, 28 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG., Oct. 11, 1995, at 169.
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language and is not immaterial, the statement can be immunized from
liability on a third independent ground under the Act. If plaintiff fails to plead
and prove that the forward-looking statement was made with actual
knowledge that the statement was false or misleading, then a claim does not
lie.62
This standard sets forth a more rigorous test-actual knowledge of
falsity-than is traditional under Rule lOb-5, which courts have construed to
create private liability for statements that were merely reckless. Moreover, as
the safe harbor for forward-looking statements applies, in identical language,
to claims under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, the effect of the statute
is to require proof of scienter in actions under the 1933 Act when forward-
looking statements are in question. In that way, the Act displaces, for
forward-looking statements, the strict liability standard (subject only to a
limited due diligence defense) now contained in sections 11 and 12(2) of the
1933 Act. Given the scienter requirement in this standard, a plaintiff will now
have to plead fraud with particularity required by Rule 9(b) even in a claim
arising under the 1933 Act.
6 3
What must a plaintiff prove to satisfy this rigorous test? Certainly, a
plaintiff could do so by proving that when the defendant made the forward-
looking statement, he knew the result would be different. Presumably, the
plaintiff could also prove the defendant knew that the forward-looking
statement was misleading because it omitted to disclose present facts that
would foreseeably cause results to differ. Thus, if the issuer knew that it had
just lost its biggest customer or that a key product had been found to cause
cancer, and further knew that those facts would have a material impact on its
projection, but omitted to disclose those facts, a court would be quite likely to
find that, under the Act, the forward-looking statement was made with actual
knowledge that it was misleading.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B) (Supp. U 1996); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). The Act makes a
distinction between statements by natural persons, who must themselves be proved to have made the
statement with actual knowledge of fact that the statement was false or misleading, and statements
made by the issuer. In the latter category, the plaintiff must show that the statement was made by or
with the approval of an executive officer of the issuer and that it was made or approved by such officer
with actual knowledge by the officer that this statement was misleading.
63. Note, however, that the now famous enhanced pleading requirements imposed in fraud cases
under the Reform Act apply only to claims under the 1934 Act. Thus, although Congress presumably
did not intend this result, one has the anomaly that a claim about a forward-looking statement under
the 1933 Act will require pleading consistent with old Rule 9(b), whereas the same forward-looking
statement challenged in the same lawsuit under the 1934 Act will be subject to the new statutory
requirement that the plaintiff plead the reasons why the statement was misleading and all facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
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E. Oral Forward-Looking Statements
Many forward-looking statements and projections are made orally by
senior executives to the financial press and to analysts. Even before the
Reform Act, case law indicated that oral forward-looking statements could
bespeak caution and must be reviewed in the context of the disclosure
documents that the company has contemporaneously disseminated, at least
where the speaker expressly warns of the risks that the projections may not
be achieved.64
The Reform Act codified this incipient development by providing that,
for oral forward-looking statements, the requirement that a forward-looking
statement be accompanied by meaningful cautionary language is satisfied if
(a) the statement is identified as forward-looking, (b) the speaker states that
actual results could differ materially from those projected, and (c) the oral
statement is accompanied by an oral statement that additional information
concerning factors that could cause actual results to differ materially is
contained in a specifically identified and "readily available document"--
which, the Conference Report makes clear, means a "widely disseminated"
document--such as an SEC filing, annual report, or press release.65 Of
course, the information contained in the written document must itself contain
a cautionary statement that satisfies the statutory standard.
Many companies, in fact, are clearly more comfortable providing
"guidance" to analysts and institutional investors in the informal setting of a
conference call or a one-on-one telephone conversation, in which a highly
ritualized set of code words has evolved. They allow the company's officials
to push the analyst's conclusions in the right direction-thereby managing
the market's expectations-without falling into the trap of endorsing or
"entangling" the company with the analyst's independent work product,
thereby giving rise to liability.66 The decided preference for oral "guidance"
appears to have continued in the post-Reform Act era; indeed, the latest
empirical study suggests that companies are giving more explicit oral
"guidanc"-than ever before.67
64. See In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Dees.] No. C-89-2493(A)-VRW, 1995 WL
66841 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1994).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(2) (Supp. 1I 1996); id. § 78u-5(c)(2); Statement of Managers, supra
note 2, at H 13,703.
66. For detailed discussions of the case law, see, for example, Olson, et al., The Perils of
Presstelc The SEC Addresses Entanglement and Adoption ofAnalysts' Reports, 12 INSIGHTS 2 (Mar.
1998); Richard A. Rosen, Liability for "Soft Information ": New Developments and Emerging Trends,
23 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 17-22 (1995). For the most recent case, see Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d
1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
67. See NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATIONS INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
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The Conference Report explains that it is likely to be unwieldy to make
oral forward-looking statements that comply with all of the otherwise
applicable requirements for the safe harbor, and that therefore more flexible
rules are necessary.68 The Reform Act, in the context of oral forward-looking
statements, calls for the specific incorporation of a detailed cautionary
statement by reference to a "readily available written document.'
69
Only one decision to date discusses how the safe harbor for oral
statements is actually supposed to work in practice. Rejecting plaintiffs
argument that each particular oral forecast in a conference call has to be
coupled with cautionary statements, the district judge in Lumisys70 took a
sensible, pragmatic approach that is also consistent with the statutory
language:
First, the unwieldy practice advocated by plaintiff appears contrary to
the way in which public companies currently deliver oral forward-
looking information, and contrary to the way in which people
communicate. A court need not adopt an interpretation of statutory
language in a way that leads to absurd or futile results at variance with
policy or legislation as a whole. E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office
Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96
(1998); United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). Moreover, the legislative
history supports defendants' view. The House Committee described
the rule governing oral statements as "flexible" and as no more
cumbersome than the rules governing written forward-looking
statements. House Conf. Report No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109
Stat. 737), 744-45. Furthermore, the Senate Committee Report directly
stated:
In the case of oral statements, the Committee expects that the
notice will be provided at the outset of any general discussion
of future events and that further notice will not be necessary
during the course of the discussion.
Senate Report No. 104-98, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
PRACTICES (1998).
68. Statement of Managers, supra note 2, at H13,703.
69. The Act's protection for oral forward-looking statements applies by its terms only to the
issuer and persons acting on its behalf.
70. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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(109 Stat. 737) 679, 696.7'
An interesting and unsettled issue is whether the Reform Act has, perhaps
inadvertently, narrowed the protection afforded by prior judicial decisions to
oral forward-looking disclosures. Pre-Reform Act case law consistently
recognized that oral statements can bespeak caution when reviewed in the
context of all of a company's contemporaneously outstanding public
disclosures, as well as in the context of all other information in the market,
regardless of its source. Courts find this concept especially compelling where
plaintiffs are relying on a fraud on the market theory; if the oral statement is
being conveyed to the market by the press or an analyst's report, it becomes
part of the total mix and therefore cannot be viewed in isolation, but only in
the context of all the information out there in the world-this is the "truth on
the market" defense.
The Second Circuit's In re Philip Morris Securities Litigation case
provides a striking example of a decision which requires consideration of the
context of the total mix of information available at the time of each disputed
oral statement.72 In Philip Morris, the court found oral statements of
optimism regarding the future performance of Marlboro against discount
cigarettes nonactionable, in the context of other disclosures "relating to the
defection of consumers from Marlboro to discount brands, as well as
references to the difficulties of predicting the impact of the discount
market."
73
In Grossman v. Novell, decided in August 1997, the Tenth Circuit found
that statements made by company executives in interviews and press releases
were done so "in conjunction with a registration statement that contained
many explicit risk factors and warnings .... 74 While the plaintiff argued that
the cautionary language appeared in separate documents from the interviews
and press releases, the court stuck to a theory based on the "total mix" of
information available. It found that the challenged statements, made from
April to July 1994, were all "closely proximate in time to the registration
statement," itself first filed in April and amended in July 1994, and thus
covered by the cautionary language contained in it.75 Thus, even though the
challenged statements may not have explicitly referred to the cautionary
language in the prospectus, the court found that all the statements were
71. Id.
72. San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801
(2d Cir. 1996).
73. San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 811.
74. 120F.3d 1112,1121 (l0thCir. 1997).
75. Id. at 1123.
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linked by timing and context.
In Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, Inc., another recent decision, a judge
in the Southern District of New York dismissed claims that included a claim
that the defendant made oral misrepresentations during road shows in support
of an offering.76 The court found that any road show presentations were both
not only mere "estimates of future performance made 18 months in
advance," but were in any event "subsequently contradicted by specific
disclosures in the Prospectus-which any plaintiff, regardless of his of her
level of sophistication, could have read.""
Whether such a broad view of the context in which oral statements should
be considered survives the enactment of the Reform Act remains in question.
The Act appears to require a more specific link between oral statement and
published cautionary language, yet there is a strong tradition of looking at the
"total mix" of information in fraud-on-the-market cases.
The truth of a statement, of course, remains a good defense under both
pre-Reform Act and current jurisprudence. In a class action against IBM, the
Southern District of New York recently awarded summary judgement to the
defendant because it found that oral statements made by company
management in October 1992 that IBM would continue to pay dividends "for
quite a foreseeable time" were true in the context in which they were made,
even though IBM later revised its statements in December 1992 and
announced doubts about being able to maintain payments in 1993.78
Conversely, as discussed above, patently false oral statements cannot be
covered by reference to cautionary language. In Fugman v. Aprogenex, the
court refused to dismiss a complaint alleging fraud in a company's oral
statement that it had "fixed" a problem with its technology, when in fact the
technology would not be marketable in the near future. The court pointed out
that the statement that the problem was "fixed" effectively overrode earlier
cautionary statements, and was akin to saying that an investment was now
safe.7
9
The availability of a new statutory safe harbor for oral forward-looking
statements makes it all the more imperative that executives consult with
counsel and plan before making oral statements about their company's future
prospects. If such statements are to be made, the speaker should advise his or
76. No. 95 CIV. 1465 (BSJ), 1997 WL 731804 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997).
77. Id. at *9.
78. In re International Bus. Mach. Corp. See. Litig., 954 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
79. 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (N.D. Ill. 1997). It was not helpful to the defendant that it had orally
"dismissed the cautionary language in their public disclosures as inaccurate and indicated that the
language existed only because it was 'required by the lawyers."' Id. at 1193.
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her audience that written documents containing the relevant cautionary
language are readily available. Neither the Act nor the Conference Report
says that the "readily available" document must already be in existence at the
time of the oral statement. Thus, if the speaker is discussing late-breaking
developments and is not sure that the appropriate cautionary language is to be
found in an extant written document, the company will have to consider
promptly issuing an 8-K that contains the requisite cautionary language.
Otherwise, however awkward this requirement may be, an oral forward-
looking statement canbe assured of protection only if the oral statement itself
is simultaneously accompanied with meaningful oral cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ. Thus,
the Act makes it more important than ever that companies identify and limit
the number of officers who are authorized to provide oral forward-looking
statements. These officers must be educated as to the requirements of the
Act.
F. The Duty to Update Projections and Forward-Looking Statements
A substantial body of case law from recent years deals with the
question of when an issuer has a duty to update prior forward-looking
statements. Generally speaking, the judicial consensus had been that the duty
to update does not arise whenever a company makes a forward-looking
statement or projection that was reasonable at the time but which, because of
subsequent events, has become untrue. In contrast; however, if a company
makes a statement that is revealed by subsequently discovered information to
have been inaccurate or unfounded at the time it was made, the company
must correct the prior statement within a reasonable period of time. The
Seventh Circuit held in Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co. that liability cannot
be based on circumstances that arise after the speaker makes the statement,
because the securities laws "typically do not act as a Monday Morning
Quarterback. '80
However, this relatively brightline rule is plainly eroding, and the law is
just not very clear anymore. The main culprit is a recent decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Weiner v. Quaker
Oats Co.,81 arising out of Quaker Oats' acquisition of Snapple. The
80. 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995). Although a company has no duty to update forward-
looking statements merely because changing circumstances have proven them wrong, a company can
of course limit its liability for a projection that was unreasonable when made by updating and
correcting it. Id.
81. 129F.3d310(3dCir. 1997).
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acquisition made Quaker a much more highly leveraged company, raising its
total leverage ratio to about eighty percent. Plaintiffs alleged that the
company had violated a duty to update its prior disclosures, in which Quaker
had advised the market that it had adopted a much lower debt-to-equity
"guideline." The complaint depended on the assertion that the projected debt-
to-equity ratio-and the failure to correct the guideline when it became
inaccurate-had artificially inflated the price of the company's common
stock.
The Third Circuit held that it was a question of fact as to whether the
market would have expected the company to make another prediction about
its leverage guideline if its leverage ratio were going to change significantly
by virtue of the anticipated acquisition. The Third Circuit relied heavily on its
own earlier decision in In Re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation,2 in
which the court recognized that the anti-fraud provisions of securities laws
do not impose a general duty to update or correct prior statements that were
accurate when made, but that "a duty exists to correct prior statements, if the
prior statements were true when made but misleading if left unrevised."
83
Since the Phillips case involved a fairly unequivocal statement of intent,
rather than a more amorphous projection or guideline, many practitioners had
read the Phillips case relatively narrowly and as largely consistent with the
general concept that there is no duty to update projections. The Quaker Oats
decision casts substantial doubt on whether, at least in the Third Circuit, even
accurate predictions must be updated if the underlying circumstances change.
The Reform Act is no help to one in search of illumination on this subject.
It appears to have neither expanded nor contracted the prior law. There is a
section of the statute called "Duty to Update," which reads in its entirety as
follows: "Nothing in this section shall impose upon any person a duty to
update a forward-looking statement."
84
The Conference Report does not add anything to this statement. Although
some have suggested that the intent of the provision is to eliminate any duty
to update, the more plausible reading is that the Act does not impose any
obligation to update that does not already exist.
What does seem clear, however, is that Quaker Oats might have had a
strong defense if it had cast its statement about its debt-to-equity ratio
guideline as forward-looking. It could have told the market that the guideline
was subject to revision or abandonment if the company ever decided to make
a strategic acquisition.
82. 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 1245.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(d) (Supp. II 1996); id. § 78u-5(d).
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G. Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Statements During the Quarter
Another subject on which the Reform Act sheds no light relates to the
extent to which issuers must make disclosure during a quarter about changes
in their business as they occur. Issuers ordinarily do not have to disclose
operating results as a quarter progresses-for example, declining sales or
reverse trends, changes in product mix or margins, delays in new product
introductions, etc.-unless it is necessary to correct a prior statement
inaccurate at the time it was made. Financial information is normally
disclosed quarterly-as is a company's views of known trends and
uncertainties-in the MD&A section of its Forms 10-K and 10-Q. No rule
requires the routine reporting of mere changes, or anticipated changes, in
operating results during a quarter. A number of cases have said that there is
no duty to make intraquarter disclosures, even if results are below a
company's own, and the market's, expectations.85
Strong policy reasons support this rule. It takes time for a company to
generate accurate and reliable information regarding current performance, to
analyze the information meaningfully. Requiring disclosure of such
information is therefore tantamount to requiring disclosure of internal
projections that will constantly change as the quarter progresses. That
information is inherently transitory and fragmentary, even if it is in some
metaphysical sense "current" or "unknown." As one district court has held,
"regardless of whether a public offering occurs seventeen or only two days
before the close of a fiscal quarter, data concerning a quarter that is in
progress is necessarily incomplete."
86
There is one context, however, in which the case law suggests that a
company might sometimes be required to make additional intraquarterly
disclosures-where the company is effecting a public offering and there is a
trend that, if continued through the end of the quarter, is likely to result in an
"extreme departure" from the range of results expected by the marketplace
based on publicly available information. The precise scope of this duty is not
clearly defined.
The two key cases are from the same court and were both written by the
same judge. The First Circuit has rejected a brightline rule that operating
85. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., No. CIV. 96-1077-K, 1996 \WL 881659, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 24, 1996) ("companies have no duty to disclose intraquarter results, even if those results are
lower than the company's internal projections"), affd on other grounds, 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir.
1998).
86. Zucker v. Quasha, 891 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (D.N.J. 1995), a/I'd, 82 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 85 (1996); accord Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, Inc., No. 95 CIV 1464
(BSJ), 1997 WL 731804 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997).
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information is never subject to disclosure until the quarter comes to an end,
but appears to have drawn distinctions based on the timing of the public
offering. In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the court reversed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint because it could not conclude, in the
absence of any factual record, that there was no duty to disclose intraquarter
financial information when Digital's public offering became effective eleven
days before the end of its quarter, and when it may have had information-if
plaintiffs allegations were time--"indicating some substantial likelihood
that the quarter would turn out to be an extreme departure from publicly
known trends and uncertainties."
' 7
In Glassman v. Computervision Corp., by contrast, the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs motion to file an amended
complaint.88 In Computervision, plaintiffs alleged that the company had
made material omissions in the prospectus for an initial public offering
regarding its intraquarter performance. While the First Circuit reaffirmed
aspects of the position it had taken in Digital, saying that "there is a strong
affirmative duty of disclosure in the context of a public offering," it
distinguished this case from Digital based on the timing of the public
offering.89 Here, the IPO was "more remote in time and causation" from the
end of the quarter-the offering took place seven weeks into the quarter.
Requiring disclosure at this juncture, the court said, amounted to requiring an
issuer to 'divulge[] its internal predictions"' about how the quarter might
ultimately turn out.9°
While Digital and Computervision presented similar facts, the court
appears to have been heavily influenced by the timing of the public offerings
in each case. Thus, the court seemed to say that the earlier in the quarter is
the offering, the less predictive the intraquarter information is likely to be of
the actual results. In other words, the information becomes so attenuated as to
be immaterial as a matter of law.91 Indeed, the Computervision panel cited
87. 82 F.3d 1194, 1211 (1st Cir. 1996). The author represents Digital in this case, which is
ongoing.
88. 90 F.3d 617 (lst Cir 1996).
89. Id. at 623.
90. Id. at 632.
91. For a discussion of these two cases and the First Circuit's materiality analysis, see Note,
Living in a Material World: Corporate Disclosure of Midquarterly Results, 110 HARV. L. REv. 923
(1997). Other recent cases involving a duty to disclose, or a duty to update information that has
become misleading, simply reflect the maxim that when a company is required to make disclosures, as
in the 10-K or 10-Q, those disclosures should be fully accurate. In Simon v. American Power
Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416 (D.R1I. 1996), the court refused to dismiss a claim alleging that a
manufacturer failed to fully disclose all the material information that may have been available to it-
namely, that a product defect was causing increases in inventory and delays in production-in a
quarterly report. Relying on SEC regulations governing the content of quarterly reports, the court
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Zucker v. Ouasha,92  without disapproval, presumably because the
information in that case was remote in time and causation from the results it
purportedly predicted.
M. THE NEED FOR FURTHER LEGISLATIVE ACTION
When Congress enacted the Reform Act, it appeared to have given little
or no consideration to the risk that the enhanced procedures and substantive
legal protections accorded to forward-looking disclosures could be nullified
by resort to state courts where purported nationwide class actions are pursued
under state law causes of action.93 Yet in the two and a half years since the
Reform Act was enacted, there has been a pronounced shift within the
plaintiffs' bar toward filing cases in state court, especially where the core
claim turns on whether projections were unreasonable or made in bad faith.
My own case load of new matters in the last two years is now evenly divided
between nationwide actions filed in federal and state courts. There has been a
remarkable and sustained change in strategy by plaintiffs, the full effects of
which will take years to sort out.
The most recent statistics bear this conclusion out objectively. Stanford
Law School maintains a website called the Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, which tracks such filings. As of December 1997, in the two
years after enactment of the Reform Act at least 104 class actions had been
filed in state courts across the country-not just in California, but in
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio and Texas.
Although some surveys suggest that there has been a modest decline in
the absolute number of such filings in 1997 compared to 1996, it is clear that
state court securities class action filings have increased dramatically
compared to the volume before the Reform Act. Moreover, all samplings
undercount the actual state filings, because there is no central repository of
concluded those regulations "imposed an obligation to disclose the discovery of the defect in its first
quarter 10-Q report, even though the effects of the discovery would not be realized for accounting
purposes until the next quarter." Id. at 431. Because the information was "hard" information about a
"known trend or uncertainty," disclosure was required.
92. 891 F. Supp. 1010 (D.N.L 1995), a/I'd, 82 F.2d 408 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 85
(1996).
93. Some portions of this section of this Article appeared in a different form in a dissent,
authored by Martin Seidel and me, to the Report on Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Legislation. See Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of the New York State Bar Ass'n,
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Legislation (Dec. 1997).
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information concerning such cases.94 The significance of the 1997 figure is
also doubtful in light of the bull market experienced in the past year.
The most up-to-date and comprehensive study of filing rates in both state
and federal court demonstrates conclusively that (a) the Reform Act has not
caused a decline in the volume of securities class action litigants, wherever
filed; and (b) that the volume of state court litigation remains dramatically
higher than before enactment of the Reform Act.95 This study also appears to
confirm what every litigator knows from experience-the weaker cases,
which would not pass muster in federal court under the safe harbor and the
new stringent pleading requirements, are the ones being filed in state court.
The numbers over the relevant two-year period thus reflect a shift that is
surely a direct response to a gaping hole in the regulatory scheme enacted by
Congress. In attempting to encourage more forward-looking disclosure by
narrowing the grounds on which liability can attach, Congress neglected to
preempt inconsistent state laws.
One particularly alarming and unintended consequence of the procedural
rules for securities litigation that were enacted by the Reform Act-
particularly the safe harbor and discovery stay-has been an apparent
increase in the filing of state court actions that are brought by the same
plaintiffs and law firms who have filed federal class actions, with identical or
nearly identical allegations. Both the SEC and Professors Grundfest and
Perino have noted this trend. In its April 1997 Report on the impact of the
Reform Act, the SEC stated:
[T]he number of state filings reportedly has increased. Moreover,
many of the state cases are filed parallel to a federal court case in an
apparent attempt to avoid provisions of the Reform Act.
96
94. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse Securities Litigation Study, (visited Jan. 13, 1998)
<http://www.10b5.com>. It is bewildering, to say the least, to encounter the argument that, since a
large percentage of the state class actions are being filed in California, this is a purely local problem
that it is up to the California legislature to solve. On the contrary, national corporations that have no
more meaningful contact with California than with any other state are repeatedly being required to
defend their national disclosure practices under state law even if no federal law was violated-a
spectacle that presents a national problem that calls out for a national solution.
95. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes ofAction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998).
96. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the General Counsel, Report to the
President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Apr. 1997 [hereinafter Staff Report]; see also Joseph Grundfest & Michael A.
Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience, at 7 (John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997).
In 1997 congressional testimony, SEC Chairman Levitt stated that 55% of the state claims filed
since the Reform Act were "essentially identical to those brought by the same law firm in federal
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This phenomenon is especially striking in California, but has not been
confined to that state. The California courts have often denied defendants'
motions to stay the state court discovery, even though the parallel
proceedings are transparently designed to end-run the federal stay. And the
California Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in one such case-
making it likely that, without congressional action, this problem will not go
away any time soon.
To make matters worse, defendants have been sued by rival plaintiffs
law firms in functionally identical purported nationwide class actions in two
or more different states. Because each plaintiffs firm wants to be lead
counsel and thus have access to the lion's share of any ultimate fee award, it
is not always possible to get them to cooperate and voluntarily consolidate
the cases in one forum. If the cases are not removable to federal court, there
is no reliable procedural mechanism to force the litigants into one forum.
Defendants must fall back on state law doctrines of "forum non conveniens"
and "prior action pending," which do not always result in all the cases being
sent to the same judge. This increases costs and gives rise to the risk of
inconsistent adjudications. 97 Thus, rather than reduce the litigation costs
imposed by class actions, the availability of state law claims filed in separate
actions to end-run the Reform Act has perversely forced defendants to fight
multi-front wars.
The risk of liability-or at least the risk of losing on a motion to dismiss
or for summary judgnent-is dramatically enhanced by the fact that the law
of many states in this field is relatively undeveloped. As can readily be
appreciated, the task of counseling clients and predicting and controlling
liability exposure is made significantly more complex where the legal regime
to be applied is unstable, and where the judge before whom one appears is
likely never to have seen a securities case before. Small wonder, then, that
most well-counseled companies are taking a very conservative, go-slow
approach to forward-looking disclosure opportunities.
Curiously, while the SEC report was often cited by opponents of
preemption legislation (at least prior to the SEC's announcement on March
court." Testimony of Arthur Levitt Before the House Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous
Materials, Oct. 21, 1997, at 12. The Staff Report further suggests that some of the state claims "may
migrate to federal court after discovery has taken place." StaffReport, supra, at 22.
97. Of course, this problem is not peculiar to securities litigation, but arises in several types of
class actions, including mass torts and product liability. Amendments to the United States Code to
enlarge federal subject matter jurisdiction over purported class actions are under active debate; they
would liberalize the rules under which such cases filed in state court can be removed to the federal
district courts and provide that diversity jurisdiction can be satisfied so long as any class member is a
citizen of a state diverse from that of any defendant.
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24 that it favored preemption legislation), its key findings plainly support the
perceived need for just such a statute. Among other points, although the
Commission recognized that "state court has not traditionally been the
primary forum for securities class actions," the Report verifies that there has
been a discemable increase in state court filings since passage of the Reform
Act.98 Strikingly, the SEC posits that this increase "may be the most
significant development in securities litigation post-Reform Act."99 The SEC
also acknowledged that this development "may reflect a migration of weaker
cases to state court"''  and that many defendants now face parallel federal
and state cases, which leads to "greater litigation expense than pre-Reform
Act."'101
It is evident that the availability of state court actions for common-law
fraud or under state blue-sky laws continues to undermine the utility of the
safe harbor for forward-looking statements provided by the Reform Act.
Corporations remain reluctant to take advantage of the safe harbor for
forward-looking disclosures because of a perfectly reasonable fear that state-
law securities or common-law fraud claims can be brought against them in
state class actions. Although a handful of states such as Ohio have adopted,
or are considering adoption, of "Baby Reform" Acts that emulate the
substantive provisions of the federal law, the vast majority of states have
common law or statutory standards that are far less restrictive.
Although some have expressed skepticism that fear of state court liability
is "really" behind the underwhelming corporate response to the safe harbor,
the empirical evidence is convincing. The SEC, in the Staff Report, stated
that:
Companies have been reluctant to provide significantly more forward-
looking disclosure than they had prior to enactment of the safe-
harbor .... The two most frequently cited reasons are (i) the safe
harbor provision is still new and companies are waiting to see how
courts will interpret it and how other companies are using it; and
(ii) fear of state court liability, where forward looking statements may
not be protected by the Federal safe harbor.
1 2
Fear of state court liability has been repeatedly stressed by representatives
of corporate issuers as the primary reason they have not availed themselves
98. Staff Report, supra note 96, at 69.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id.at8O
101. Id. at70.
102. Id. at 3.
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of the safe harbor. 103
That these fears are far from capricious is borne out by further findings of
the SEC Report. Thus, the Commission found empirical evidence that state
court complaints "are more likely to be based solely on forecasts which have
not materialized." 10 4 As a matter of fact, the Commission's data shows that
allegations based on forward-looking statements are more than twice as
likely to be filed in state than in federal court: twenty-five percent of "stand
alone" state complaints (those filed without a parallel federal suit) "are based
solely on failed forecasts (as compared to twelve percent at the federal
level)."'05
To be sure, some have called for more empirical research to attempt to
measure how significant is the fear of state court litigation. Wholly apart
from the fact that there is no empirical way to segregate fear of state law
liability from the impact of other factors, I submit that the objection is
incorrect in principle. Even if fear of state law liability is only one obstacle to
realization of congressional intent, and even if the absolute number of state
court filings has abated, there is an omnipresent risk that any given issuer
will be sued in state court, thus evading core federal policies. Passage of
uniform standards legislation will eliminate at least one obstacle to greater
use of the safe harbor.
Similarly, some critics have contended that legislation is superfluous
because it is unlikely that plaintiffs will shift claims to state court because of
substantive and procedural problems with nationwide class actions in state
courts. They point to the fact that most states-including California and
Delaware' 06-have refused to endorse the fraud-on-the-market doctrine,
enshrined in the Supreme Court's decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,"0 7 that is
a sine qua non of federal securities class actions. Moreover, they contend that
there are major due process obstacles to applying the substantive law of one
state to all members of a nationwide class-as illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts °8
But these trends (however salutary they may be) are of cold comfort to
issuers today. These issues are being litigated in state courthouses all over the
103. Letter from American Electronics Associates to Representative Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
(Apr. 10, 1997), quoted in Staff Report, supra note 96, 23.
104. Staff Report, supra note 96, at 2, 5.
105. Id. at 73.
106. See Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993); Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467
(Del. 1992).
107. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
108. 472 U.S. 797, 818, 821-22 (1985). Accord, e.g., Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc., 198 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 654-59 (1988).
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country, often in states that have little or no law on the subject, before judges
who have often never had prior experience with such matters. Until and
unless definitive decisions on these issues-and numerous other outstanding
questions-are rendered by the supreme courts of each of the fifty states, no
issuer can be confident about what legal regime-and what procedural
rules-will apply to a nationwide class action about its soft information
disclosures. Yet that process will take decades, during which the plaintiffs'
bar will be looking for every opportunity to expand the scope of liability by
invoking various legal theories, grounded in expansive contract, tort and
fiduciary duty claims, in every jurisdiction in the country.
The ultimate risk is what I call the "least common denominator" problem.
If only one state appellate court adopts a standard of liability that is radically
inconsistent with federal law in this area, there will be a rush to that forum.
This is no way to run a national securities disclosure regime.
Waiting to see how plaintiffs' lawyers use the state courts has the real-
world consequence of imposing the multi-million dollar costs of defending
these actions upon corporate defendants. Similarly, to the extent the Reform
Act intended to eliminate the burden of early discovery by requiring that
discovery be stayed during the pendency of motions to dismiss, delay in
eliminating parallel state court litigation-in which many courts have
declined to issue such stays-simply thwarts the relief Congress intended to
provide in 1995.
IV. THE PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Two similar but not identical bills have been passed by the Senate and
House, which, in one way or another, would require certain securities class
actions based on false or misleading statements to be brought in federal court
exclusively under federal law. As of this writing (early August 1998) Senate
Bill 1260 has been endorsed by the President and three SEC Commissioners,
including Chairman Levitt, and was passed by a large majority in the Senate
on May 13.109 The House passed its version ° of the legislation by a vote of
109. Senator Gramm introduced Senate Bill 1260 on October 7, 1997 with 18 co-sponsors. The
bill was referred that same day to the Senate committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. The
Subcommittee on Securities held hearings October 29, 1997 on Senate Bill 1260. On April 29, the
Senate Banking Committee voted to report the bill-now called the "Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998"--to the full Senate. The SEC's support for Senate Bill 1260 is evidenced in a
March 24, 1998 letter to Senators D'Amato, Gramm and Dodd, and was reiterated the following day at
the Senate hearing on Chairman Levitt's nomination to a second term. See Letter from Arthur Levitt et
al., Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Alfonse M. D'Amato, Chairman, Committee
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs (Mar. 24, 1998) (on file with Washington University Law
Quarterly).
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340 to 83 on July 22.
The stated goal of these bills is to forestall the efforts, described above, by
the plaintiffs' bar to end-run the safe harbor under the Reform Act by filing
securities class actions in state court. As Representative Bliley put it:
[T]he explosion of cases being brought in state court since the Reform
Act demonstrates that the problem has not been eliminated, it has just
changed venue. The Uniform Standards Act will permit meritorious
claims to continue to be filed, while preventing the migration of
baseless class actions to state courts."'
If enacted, any of the bills under consideration would prevent evasion not
only of the Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-looking statements, but
also of the correlative procedural innovations under the Act, including the
discovery stay, lead plaintiff and pleading standards provisions.
A. What the Bills Do
Both bills would amend the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"). The bills would create
exceptions to section 16(a) of the 1933 Act, which currently preserves "all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." A proposed
section 16(b) under both of the proposed amendments would create new
limitations on actions brought under state statutory or common law,
irrespective of whether such actions were commenced or maintained in state
court or federal court.
House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 would prohibit the pursuit in state
court of a "class action" (a broadly defined term in both bills that is much
broader than its meaning under Rule 23) if the suit alleges:
(A) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.
110. H.R 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
111. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 144 CONG. REC. H6052-60, H6055
(daily ed. July 21, 1998); see also id. at H6059 (remarks of Rep. Eshoo); H6059 (remarks of Rep.
Cox); Report on the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (to accompany House Bill
1689), H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10, 12 (1998) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; Report on the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (to accompany Senate Bill 1260), S. REP. No. 105-182, at
1-4 (1998) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
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House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 also propose to add a new
section 16(c), which would provide for the removal to federal court of any
class action pending in a state court which involves a "covered security" if
the allegations specified in section 16(b) are asserted. House Bill 1689 and
Senate Bill 1260 would also subject the removed action to the prohibition of
section 16(b) against asserting any state securities law claims in class actions.
B. Definition of "Covered Security"
The most important difference between the two bills lies in their
definitions of the term "covered security."
Senate Bill 1260 defines "covered security" to encompass securities that
satisfy the standards of either section 18(b)(1) 112 or section 18(b)(2)113 of the
1933 Act. Senate Bill 1260 thereby includes the securities of investment
companies that are registered, or which have filed registration statements,
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Senate bill also covers
senior securities of listed companies, even if the security was not itself listed
on a national exchange at the time of the alleged misconduct
1 4
House Bill 1689 adopts the definition of section 18(b)(1) of the 1933 Act
as its definition of "covered security," with a twist. It excludes debt securities
that are issued in private placements. House Bill 1689 does not cover shares
of mutual funds.
One regrettable change from earlier incarnations of the House bill is that
it originally covered all securities of a corporate issuer which has at least one
112. Section 18(b)(l) provides as follows:
For the purposes of this section, the following are covered securities:
(1) Exclusive Federal Registration of Nationally Traded Securities. A security is a covered
security if such security is:
(A) listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange, or listed on the National Market System of the Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor
to such entities);
(3) listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange (or tier or segment thereof)
that has listing standards that the Commission determined by rule (on its own initiative or on the
basis of a petition) are substantially similar to the listing standards applicable to securities
described in subparagraph (A); or
(C) is a security of the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security to a security
described in subparagraph (A) or (3).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(l) (1994).
113. Section 18(b)(2) provides as follows: "Exclusive federal registration of investment
companies-a security is a covered security if such security is a security issued by an investment
company that is registered, or that has filed a registration statement, under the Investment Company
Act of 1940." 15 U.S.C, § 77r(b)(d) (1994).
114. For a critique of this provision, see John C. Coffee, Jr., State Securities Preemption: The
Hidden Issues, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1998, at 5.
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nationally traded security outstanding. If an issuer has any class of security
outstanding that is not subject to the uniform standards legislation, it remains
at risk for state law claims for any forward-looking disclosure made in
reliance on the safe harbor. These issuers have one management and make
one disclosure which can impact all their securities. To be effective, the safe
harbor should protect issuers as to all outstanding classes of their
securities." 5
C. Definition of Class Action
Both House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260, in proposed section 16(f)(3),
define class action broadly to include any single lawsuit or group of lawsuits
(other than a derivative action) filed in or pending in the same court
involving common questions of law or fact, in which:
(A) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons and in
which common questions (without reference to issues of
individualized reliance) predominate; or
(B) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a
representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed
parties similarly situated and common questions predominate; or
(C) one or more of the parties seeking to recover damages did not
personally authorize the filing of the lawsuit and common questions
predominate." 6
The definition also applies to any group of lawsuits filed or pending in the
same court in which damages are sought on behalf of fifty or more persons
and the actions are joined, consolidated or otherwise proceed as a single
action.'17 Thus, defendants may have the opportunity to use the combined
rules governing removal of such case (which is permitted under the statute
without regard to diversity) and then transfer the scattered cases under
section 1404 to consolidate them in one forum. The net result may be that an
individual investor who sued under state law may find himself part of an
involuntary "class" whose claim is preempted by federal law.
The broad definition of a "class" is especially important in light of the
recent flurry of activity in the filing by plaintiffs' bar of the so-called "mass
115. It is of some concern that neither of the bills as currently drafted cover municipal securities
or limited partnerships-the focus of some of the largest and costliest of class action litigation in
recent years. This can easily be corrected by extending the definition of "covered securities" to include
all of the securities identified in section 18(b) of the 1933 Act.
116. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
117. See S. 1260 § 16(g)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. 1689 § 16(O(2)(A)(ii).
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action," brought in the names of hundreds of individually named plaintiffs,
who are often limited partners in an investment partnership.' 18 Especially
with the dismantling in most states of the rules against solicitation of clients
and lawyer advertising, many plaintiffs' finns have aggressively sought to
recruit clients, on a fixed-fee basis, to bring mass actions-often in the very
same matters that have already given rise to a class action under Rule 23 or
its state law analogues. Touting the purported advantages of such mass suits
over class actions, largely based on the assertion that the damage recovery
will be higher than the paltry actual return on most class actions, these
plaintiffs' lawyers urge class members to opt out and pursue separate
remedies. Both proposed bills, quite appropriately, are written to cover such
suits-which pose many of the same risks to issuers that conventional class
actions do. Importantly, the bills also enable defendants to force all actions
arising out of the same facts into one forum, thus avoiding the all-too-
common problem of being forced to litigate in several state and federal
forums simultaneously.
D. Proposed Amendments to Section 28 of the 1934 Act
All three bills would amend section 28 of the 1934 Act, to the same effect
as the amendments to section 16 of the 1933 Act.
E. Retroactivity
The provisions of House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 are expressly
limited so as not to affect or apply to any action commenced before and
pending on the date of their enactment.
F. The Scope of the Proposed Legislation
Critics have been quick to assert that passage of any of either version of a
uniform standards bill would eliminate all state court class actions involving
corporate governance or extraordinary corporate transactions such as
mergers, acquisitions or reorganizations. The SEC pressed its concerns on
this subject, as well. The sponsors of the legislation and their allies have
repeatedly and emphatically stated that each of the proposed bills is intended
to address only claims for misstatements or omissions in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. Derivative suits, which raise claims for breach
of fiduciary duty due to mismanagement, corporate waste or conflict of
118. This is a point stressed in the Senate Report. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 111, at 4-5.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
interest, are not affected.
Drawing on a task force of practitioners and law professors who
recommended certain amendments which have drawn the endorsement of
Chairman Levitt and two other SEC commissioners, both bills contain an
exclusion for causes of action traditionally arising under state laws imposing
a fiduciary duty of disclosure. Specifically, the exclusion is designed to
preserve the availability of class actions in state court where state law
already provides that directors of corporations have fiduciary disclosure
obligations to current shareholders. The exclusion has been drafted to be
directly responsive to the concern of critics that certain well-entrenched state
law remedies should not inadvertently be preempted by the new federal
legislation.
Specifically, under both Senate Bill 1260 and House Bill 1689, a class
action is not preempted by the federal statute if it involves:
(A) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of
the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the
issuer, or
(B) any recommendation, position or other communication with
respect to the sale of the securities of the issuer that
(i) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to
holders of equity securities of the issuer; and
(ii) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to voting
their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or
exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights. "9
Although there is little published history concerning the evolution of this
language-which has become known as the "Delaware carve out"-it is
evident that the provision is designed to preserve remedies where directors
have recommended a vote or acceptance of a tender offer under Rule 14D(9)
or where shareholders must vote on a transaction between the corporation
and minority shareholders.120 This list of transactions matches precisely those
119. See S. 1260 § 16(f)(3)13); H.R. 1689 § 16(11(3)(A).
120. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 111, at 4; HOUsE REPORT, supra note 111, at 17.
Specifically, the Senate Report states:
The Committee is keenly aware of the importance of state corporate law, specifically those states
that have laws that establish a fiduciary duty of disclosure. It is not the intent of the Committee in
adopting this legislation to interfere with state law regarding the duties and performance of an
issuer's directors or officers in connection with a purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an
affiliate from current shareholders or communicating with shareholders with respect to voting
their shares, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenter's or appraisal
rights.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 111, at 4.
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circumstances in which the Delaware courts have already held that directors
have a fiduciary duty of disclosure to existing shareholders. Since the
preemption legislation, in any of its versions, does not now preempt
traditional derivative actions, the Delaware carve out does not attempt to deal
with derivative actions at all. Rather, as noted, its focus is on that narrow
category of class actions, often brought in state court, in which current
shareholders of a corporation allege that the directors, in specific
circumstances-normally involving extraordinary transactions-breached a
fiduciary duty of disclosure.
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